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ephemera
theory & politics in organization 
notes
Dialoguing Play  
Pat Kane  
In discussion with Steve Linstead and Rob McMurray. With additional questions 
by Andy McColl, Sebastian Bos and Ed Wray-Bliss. 
In 2004, Pat Kane published The Play Ethic: A Manifesto for a Different Way of Living (Macmillan), 
which went into mass-market paperback in September 2005. Pat’s commitment to bridging boundaries 
between the arts, sciences and social sciences to open up new possibilities for working, living and 
creating futures together struck a chord with the Department of Management Studies at the University of 
York, who appointed him Visiting Fellow in 2005. To inaugurate the appointment, on October 5th 2005 
Pat presented a 90 minute overview of the ideas in the book, followed by a 90 minute seminar discussion. 
The questions and responses taken from the discussion were edited, reworked and updated by Pat (in 
between writing and recording a new Hue and Cry album) and the resulting text is presented here. 
Rob McMurray: Before I start, I’d just like to thank Pat for presenting his ideas in The 
Play Ethic and make the point that for me the book’s great strength is its commitment to 
bringing together sharp observation of contemporary socio-economic-cultural 
phenomena and new developments in science with a sustained and wide ranging effort 
to respect theory and ground its deliberations in philosophical reflection that has been 
historically worked through from classical formulations to current cutting edge 
challenges. 
Steve Linstead: I’d like to echo that. I think it is this respect for scholarship, rather than 
just empiricism or method, that differentiates this book from so many others that will 
populate the bookstores of airport terminals – Gibson Burrell’s ‘Heathrow Organization 
Theory’ – and gives us valuable material to work with and from as it challenges us to 
develop a new and meaningful approach across the social sciences. It’s an important 
project and it will mean that the book continues to be discussed, seriously, for some 
time to come – which is what it merits and why the University of York’s Department of 
Management Studies are happy to welcome Pat and his vision. 
My first question, Pat is one about point of view. It’s a common assumption that play is 
a luxury, something we can do when we can afford the time, the toys, the tools and 
technology or the investment in skill or sociability required. Accordingly, reflecting on 
play and adopting a subject position that allows us to read, narrate or even author the 
world in terms of play implies a degree of privilege – perhaps a Western, middle-class 
abstract 
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perspective. The question then is … can play be relevant at all to child labour in 3rd 
world sweatshops, those dying of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, the victims of 4th world 
famine, the global underclasses identified by Bauman and Castells that appear to be the 
necessary fallout of capitalism, those oppressed not just by totalitarianism but by the 
everyday terror of genocide? 
Pat Kane: For me, it’s very important that before we begin to situate play’s ‘relevance’ 
to a range of pressing political and economic issues, we examine some of those 
‘common assumptions’ about play. For one thing, play conceived as a ‘luxury’ needs to 
be related more deeply to its socio-biological function. The greatest contemporary 
scholar of play, Brian Sutton-Smith, notes (in The Ambiguity of Play) that the purpose 
of play for advanced mammals is as a form of ‘adaptive potentiation’ – that is, as a 
generator of possible worlds and actions within defined times and places, an activity 
that helps the organism prepare and rehearse itself for the dense and manifold 
interactions of the wider social environment. So in a sense, play’s luxury is our literal 
birth-right, by virtue of the developmental role that it has not only in our childhoods, 
but (increasingly today) in our post-patriarchal, post-bureaucratic forms of adulthood 
too. The ‘privilege’ of play, from this perspective, is the right to continue that balance 
between sufficient material security, and self-chosen risk and experiment, that 
characterises the development process of childhood.  
My argument in The Play Ethic, however, is that this continuance of a playful spirit and 
mentality in our lives isn’t just about a kind of internal recovery of ‘childness’ (the 
gambit of many New-Age oriented advisers and consultants in the world of 
organizational reform and change), but requires a political take on how the supporting 
conditions for human play can be politically and institutionally secured. In short, we are 
both players in the playground, and conscious designers and facilitators of the 
playground. Now, in the richer parts of the world, my call for us to be ‘active players’ in 
our societies and economies undoubtedly benefits from post-scarcity, affluence and the 
excess capacity of techno-culture – we have the means, tools, times and places to be 
players. To me, the essence of a play-ethical perspective is to keep asking, ‘who gets to 
play? What does it mean to play? Who does it benefit and harm?’ I’ll develop this later, 
but my hope for a rich discussion about the nature of play in Western societies is that it 
gets us to reckon with the civic responsibilities that come with our semiotic and 
communicational freedoms. If we have that privileged moment of autonomy, self-
realisation and self-awareness called play in our developed-world lives, what are we 
doing with it? How are we using its ‘world-imagining’ potentials to shift towards a less 
unjust and exploitative world? 
SL: Partly what you’re saying is that play is ontological, and that it unites mammals as 
simply engaged with reality as Gregory Bateson’s otters and reflexively critical about 
how that reality is represented as Jacques Derrida. Our question then becomes: how do 
socio-political conditions distort its forms and possibilities? Is play a potential source of 
emancipation, of resistance, of stimulating human potential and bridging the ontical and 
the metaphysical – and if it is how best can we possibly attempt that? 
PK: I think the ontological nature of play is fascinating, but in no way automatically 
implies an emancipatory potential. Recently, I’ve been interested in the use of ludic and 
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playful language in military and diplomatic discourse. There is a long and enduring 
tradition within military elites of using simulation and game-based strategy – from the 
Chinese and Indian precursors of chess in the 9th century, to the Bush cabal and their 
‘game-changing’ rhetoric in the middle-East.1 The Pentagon ‘adaptively potentiates’ its 
manoeuvres in the ‘war on terror’, deploying a whole raft of strategies that partake of 
various modalities of play – including game theory (as a rationale for pre-emptive 
strikes), multi-user networks coordinating troop activity (these explicitly modelled on 
computer game culture). The simulatory moment of play is needed in all these activities 
– that suspension of reality, of ‘taking reality lightly’ as Schiller put it, which enables 
mass destruction and disruption to seem like ‘the great game’ of global war. Yet it 
strikes me that the response to this cannot be an anti-ludicism – some reassertion of 
solidity against fluidity, or even of solidarity against networks. We need to think our 
way through a possible ‘play ethics’ in order that we can identify what the emergent 
‘counter-game’ against the top-down games of imperial power might be. The societal 
ontology of play is, to me, very well explained by the slogan given by Hardt and Negri 
in Empire – that is, ‘there is no outside’. We are in an agonistic world composed of 
‘networks of networks’, a planetary ground of play and interaction, where the means of 
counter-organization are entirely within our grasp. The political priority is 
inventiveness, initiative and energy in the face of this global-societal field – enacted by 
a growing mass of self-conscious political players, who wish to use this systemic 
instability to create their own counter-publics and even counter-realities. We are already 
at play and in play – our emancipation depends on our activism. I’m beginning to 
realise that the tradition of agonistic political philosophy refined by Foucault, Laclau, 
Deleuze and Guattari is very congenial to a play-ethic perspective. 
RM: Could [I] come in here and I press you then to be a bit more specific on how do we 
enable those at the bottom of the corporate ladder to realise their capacities and selves 
through play? Even in organizations that are creating the new play commons (such as 
the BBC) there are armies of cleaners, often immigrants, whose lives are not in-play 
when it comes to organizational and wider life except in the sense that they are subject 
to the fates of commercial gods. They are un-empowered and may be working for a 
subsistence wage. In the absence of an immediate economic or technological revolution 
what can a play ethic offer them? 
PK: Glad to get back to organizations! To begin with, I’m pretty traditionally left-wing 
when it comes to securing proper wages and conditions for those in service work – the 
trade unions still have a primary function here, and have to continually evolve their 
reach in the face of immigrant and part-time labour conditions. (My favourite story of 
the relationship between playful organizations and service work is that of Las Vegas, 
one of the most tightly unionised cities in America2). But on a wider perspective, I still 
agree with the post-industrial utopian Andre Gorz when he identified that the central 
problem of an equitable post-work society is – who does the chores? And I agree that 
there’s a huge bogusness about places like the BBC whose staff self-consciously pursue 
a creative, playful ethic, yet leave the Morlocks to come in and clean up after the Eloi’s 
__________ 
1  See my article for the Guardian’s Comment is Free site, [http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ 
pat_kane/2006/08/ the_dangers_of_gamechanging.html]) 
2  See Marc Cooper’s 2004 article in The Nation [http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040524/cooper]. 
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cavortings.3 I think the horizon of ‘who gets to play?’ has to be consistently addressed, 
in every realm, and at every level in an organization: I would go so far as to propose a 
combination of self-service practices, as part of every employee’s daily duties (it’s an 
expression of collective care to leave your desk in a state of cleanliness and tidiness), 
and an agenda for the robotisation of cleaning (nowadays a matter of office design and 
technical investment, rather than SF fantasy). 
These would be practical responses arising from a re-conceptualising of the role of care 
and service in our entire lives – something I try to address in the book, when talking 
about the ‘play-care continuum’, a continuum of ‘response-abilities’. I think it is clearly 
possible to conceive of care and service as a gratifying response to the contingencies of 
our complex lives – and that there might be those (already well evidenced in the 
‘caring’ professions) whose ‘response-abilities’ might be more attuned to the finitude of 
needs and standards (care), and less attuned to the infinitudes of horizons and 
possibilities (play). (Though in my view everyone has their own parabola, makes their 
own shape, around both ends of this continuum). The ‘art of care’ – perhaps better 
termed the ‘craft of care’ – could possibly be realised for some in the labour market as a 
positive identity, if we had a collective narrative for ourselves as ‘players and carers’ 
(rather than ‘workers’ and ‘lifers’). 
In this ‘play-care continuum’, the right of creative activity would be balanced by the 
responsibility of maintaining its conditions of possibility, part of which would involve 
the inclusion of weaker players and the restoration of fatigued or broken players. The 
social apartheid implied by the time-poor/money-rich phenomenon can be addressed at 
root here. In a situation where self-care, mutual care and automated care increases, as an 
aspect of the social organization of playerhood, the ‘cleaner’ or ‘maintainer’ becomes 
someone for whom ‘cleaning’ is, in a real sense, a holistic or poietic act (in the way that 
carpentry, or teaching, has a vocational or self-realising force). I’m aware that this is a 
highly speculative vision of play and care as a dominant moral continuum in society. 
However I tend to agree with Frederic Jameson in The Seeds of Time that it often seems 
“easier to imagine the end of the earth and the end of nature than it is to imagine the 
ends of capitalism”. To imagine a society of players and carers is to think on the other 
side of currently existing capitalist society. 
SL: Which then raises the question of subjectivity – the relation of play to self and 
identity. One of the shadows cast over our modern understanding of the character of the 
player identity is Kierkegaard’s outline of the aesthetic life as a style of disengagement 
in part one of Either/Or. For Kierkegaard’s Don Juan type of character, the point of the 
aesthetic life was to refuse all commitment, but also to take no responsibility for that – 
the triumph of the player gliding through relationships was not simply to seduce, but to 
then unseduce the lover into breaking off the relationship and being happy to do so, so 
__________ 
3  The Morlocks were a humanoid species of below-ground dwellers, whilst the Eloi lived above 
ground, in H.G.Wells’ The Time Machine (1895). The original proletarian Morlocks, who serviced 
and provided infrastructure for the Eloi, were sinister and cannibalistic, and used the aristocratic, 
placid and dissolute Eloi as a dietary staple. The terminology has since been widely applied to the 
distinction between hierarchically divided communities. Wikipedia offers a fascinating summary of 
the post-Wellsian acceptations of the terms, including the X-Men, Doctor Who and a scooter gang in 
Berlin. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ ; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eloi] 
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that the player could slip free without any guilt being attached for the betrayal or break-
up. Sartre sought to combat this bad faith through angst, Levinas through reconfiguring 
alterity, but neither was a player as such. How can we combat or address the power of 
the received 19th century prejudice against play as being superficial and evasive and 
present a vision of play as a practice of ethically responsible subjects? 
PK: That’s a lovely historical reference. And that characterisation of the feckless, 
irresponsible player is strongly taken up by Zygmunt Bauman in his books on 
consumerism. In terms of Sutton-Smith’s and others’ spectrum of discourses and 
paradigms generated around the human propensity to ‘adaptively potentiate’, 
Kierkegaard’s power-player and ego-player (spurning the social and developmental 
elements of playerhood) is particularly recognisable, and particularly male also. My 
answer to this prejudice is to emphasize the diversity of purposes and relationships that 
playful activity can and does encompass – the collectively-affirming identity of play-as-
sociality in carnival and ritual, the nurturing and educative power of developmental 
play, the possibility for projective empathy in play-as-imagination, the sheer surrender 
of ego and agency involved in the ‘play’ of fate and the cosmos. In short, you counter 
Don Juan with Indra’s Net, or Shakespeare, or Froebel, or the Notting Hill Carnival. To 
me, a play ‘ethics’ is almost – as Bauman says very clearly in Postmodern Ethics – the 
very definition of ethical choice itself. Play is activity that can be characterised as 
operating at the very extremes of both agency and structure: when faced with this 
diversity of praxis, we are forced into concrete and urgent arguments about how forms 
of play might shape and develop the good society or the good person. Not that this is 
easy to do. My fall back on a workable ‘play ethic’ is the distinction between finite and 
infinite games as outlined by the theologian James Carse – corresponding roughly to 
zero-sum and non-zero-sum games: play aimed at victory, against play aimed at 
continuing the play, gaining enlightenment from its development and mutation. Don 
Juan plays for the victory of seduction, which then has to come to terminus, in order 
that another victory might be secured: a finite player. Perhaps Casanova, or the 
participants in the Kama Sutra, are infinite players in this respect? 
RM: I’d like to come in on this question of authenticity if I can. Pat, you talk about 
authenticity being a construct. You note that once we realise it is a construct we no 
longer have to be constrained by it. Could not The Play Ethic itself be read as a tract on 
authenticity – albeit fluid and multiple – but a prescription (Pat Kane’s prescription?) 
for authenticity nonetheless? 
PK: I’m tempted to go along with my Buddhist friends on this one – that is, we live in a 
state of reality that is in a state of permanent play, mutation and change (identify that at 
whatever level you wish), but that we can only survive and make sense of this through 
specific and contingent forms of identity (samsara is their term). So yes, the ontological 
emergence and fluidity that play discloses allows the constructs of authenticity to 
happen. But yes, fair cop: to be able to intuit, and then live with, change-as-permanence 
– even in the midst of a samsaric existence – is itself a claim to a deeper ‘reality’ about 
our lives. I find the same ‘normativity about norm plurality’ in Deleuze’s writings – 
asserting strong claims about the processual nature of social reality as against a much 
stiffer and more authoritarian model, yet never quite aware of (or owning up to) the 
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progressive nature of this claim. If ‘authenticity’ means ‘being true to the non-dual 
nature of the universe’, rather than to yourself, then I’ll happily endorse authenticity.  
SL: Somewhat relatedly to this discussion, a question you yourself initiate in the book is 
the question of audience, of play as display, and I’d like you to expand on that theme a 
little if you would. Guy Debord made the situationist position clear in arguing that we 
live in a society of the spectacle, where Marxist alienation is not merely from the 
objects of production but from the unfolding of reality itself, from which we are largely 
unattached and look on. Baudrillard took the point further arguing that we don’t just 
look on at reality because we cannot know what it is independently of our being in it 
and acting it out – but such a reality is merely a simulacrum of signs, symbols and 
information that elicits us to participate in particular ways that realise its illusory 
aspects. We might be alienated, but we aren’t alienated from anything knowable, and 
we are engaged in reproducing simulacra. So for Debord spectation is important, and 
for Baudrillard it is more like spectaction – but the point of both is that we perform, that 
play is play for, that there are audiences even if they are only other players. Perhaps the 
sort of reality TV that is Big Brother captures this simultaneity. But the question is, if 
play is performance, how do we arrive at an ethics of display? If play is performative, is 
it just another form of work that takes us back to a modified work ethic? 
PK: I have been focussed in answering this question by a superb essay from the 
technology critic Alexander Galloway, ‘Warcraft and Utopia’. Let me quote from it: 
Adorno argues [in Aesthetic Theory] that play activities are forms of repetition, and on this many 
agree, but he goes further to assert that “in art, play is from the outset disciplinary [and] art allies 
itself with unfreedom in the specific character of play.” For Adorno, play has been co-opted by the 
routine of modern life. “The element of repetition in play is the afterimage of unfree labour, just as 
sports – the dominant extra-aesthetic form of play – is reminiscent of practical activities and 
continually fulfils the function of habituating people to the demands of praxis, above all by the 
reactive transformation of physical displeasure into secondary pleasure, without their noticing that 
the contraband of praxis has slipped into it.” Thus, in the work of Adorno, play is not a vacation 
from the pressures of production, but rather the form-of-appearance (‘afterimage’) of that mode 
itself, with repetition, displeasure, and competitive interaction being but symptoms for deeper 
social processes. [http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=507] 
I agree with Adorno and Galloway that sports is an example of a culture of display, of 
spectation, smuggling in a ‘modified work ethic’ – particularly in the spectacle of 
football, where all the tendencies of the new capitalism (disloyal, hyper-individualised 
employees; performativity as a self-subverting cult; results-driven, visionary 
management; the tensions of living out and up to a ‘brand’ culture) are served up as 
daily narrative entertainment for the viewing millions. It’s almost perfectly ideological 
– the ‘repetition, displeasure and competitive interaction’ of football as the ideal ‘after-
image of unfree labour’. Galloway makes the salient point that, in some multi-user 
online synthetic worlds, the dues and routines that means you ‘stay in the game’ of 
World of Warcraft are almost indistinguishable from the kinds of unfree labour that 
constitutes an ‘offline’ life. As he puts it, “networks are the establishment and play is 
work”. Galloway’s other brilliant point is that perhaps we don’t need a labour theory of 
value, but a play theory of value, given how central play is becoming to information 
capitalism.  
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Yet I’d resist the notion – which I think constantly recurs in invocation of play in these 
kinds of arguments – that play has to be confined to a particular combination of 
elements in its spectrum. This is how Galloway describes play, as an 
irreducible, heterogeneous, unquantifiable, absolutely qualitative human endeavour. 
Conventionally speaking, play is entirely divorced from any kind of productive activity. Play is 
defined as a negative force that is often a direct threat to production. Play is leisure; play is the 
inversion of production. Play is an uncapitalizable segment of time. One may return to Friedrich 
Schiller on the play-drive: the play-drive is a pure moment, and it is a very necessary moment, 
Schiller would claim, for man's development, but one that is entirely outside the formal, or the 
abstract, or all the kinds of human drives that lead to the creation of society as a whole. 
What’s interesting here is how badly Galloway misrepresents Schiller’s play-drive. As 
Terry Eagleton adroitly points out in The Ideology of the Aesthetic, in the ‘Letters on the 
Aesthetic Education of Man’, Schiller actually interposes the play-drive as a hegemonic 
term, mediating between the ‘form-drive’ of rationality, and the ‘sense-drive’ of 
irrationality – historicized by Eagleton as Schiller’s horrified response, in 1794, to the 
unholy alliance of the philosophies and the mob in the spectacle of the French 
Revolution. And play as display and performance – the active and shaping ‘aesthetic 
education’ that would provide for an integrated model of citizenship and social 
involvement – was very much Schiller’s ideal, what he called the ‘aesthetic state’. It’s 
extremely tempting in the age of Big Brother to revive Schiller’s notion: could the 
concepts of ‘aesthetic’ and ‘state’ ever be brought more appropriately together? And it’s 
an easy step to identify the hegemonic aspects of Big Brother as a form of performative 
play. Just as immaterial labour (in the Italian autonomists’ sense) becomes aware of 
itself as a driving force in the development of society, the spectacle moves into to 
depoliticize, privatise, and trivialise it. Even more hegemonically, we can see Big 
Brother as orchestrating movements across the dividing line between passive spectation 
and active participation with consummate ease – a simulation of the opening-up of the 
spectacle. Slavoj Žižek (1989) has called this ‘interpassivity’ as opposed to interactivity 
– a simulation of interaction, guided by existing yet subtle commercial scripts for 
behaviour. 
Is there an irreducibly open, primordial aspect to play, the sheer difference celebrated 
by Derrida, driven by mammalian adaptive potentiation? Yes. And if so, then that 
provides the ‘adjacent possible’ within any social system (as the complexity theorists 
put it) to imagine different forms of display than those which currently canalise the 
energies of the informational multitude. I’m sure that we’ll participate and spectate in 
some form of ‘reality TV’ show at some point (Little Brother? Big Sister? Average 
Activist?) which, as Galloway says, will imagine a life after capitalism “through a 
utilization of the very essence of capitalism.” I have, like Hardt and Negri, a degree of 
optimism about the mobility of power-flows across a thoroughly networked planet to 
think that this expressive possibility will be realised, at some point by some group of 
activists, and create a different form of display that will ‘pierce through’ the spectacle it 
participates in. Which leads us to our next question… 
SL: … which is the inevitable one of technology. We are used to the dualism 
characterised by the sort of technological determinism that disturbed Marx on the one 
hand, and the utopia of technological possibility that excited the same Marx on the 
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other, as you note in the book. We have perhaps become used to a more modified 
prostheticism that sees us extending human capability by means of artificial 
enhancements rather than by revolution, but such a cyborg vision does raise the 
question of what it means to be human and whether we are becoming post-human. 
Social-technological change as studied, for example, by actor-network theorists argues 
that objects have agency and that humans are part-objects themselves. If we are going to 
play with technology, are we thereby compelled to play with what it is to be human and 
non-human? And in working that boundary, is the play ethic a messy ethic, as John Law 
might put it? 
PK: You’re right to suggest that a play perspective brings us quickly to consider the 
post-human condition. There is no reason why ‘adaptive potentiation’ as a necessary 
flexibility, redundancy and excess in the developing mammal, would not begin to 
include those potentiations that might result from those extraordinary human ‘play-
tools’ of the bio- or neuro-sciences. One of the truly futuristic tendencies in 
contemporary theory is exactly those post-human networks/rhizomes of affect and 
movement identified by thinkers like Latour or Deleuze. The mind-wrenching nature of 
their insights – that there might be lines of change and transformation which pass 
through machine, human, nature, which may be only retrospectively comprehensible, 
but which in the meantime liberate us into creative action comfortable with the idea of 
no predictable outcome – is anticipated by the sheer diversity of definitions of agency 
and determination represented by ‘play’ in our cultural archive, and across many 
cultures. That is – to use Sutton-Smith’s typology – play can signify being caught up in 
agonistic networks, or being surrendered to the inhuman play of the universe, or being 
involved in the ‘technology of improvement’ that is education, or entering into a 
cognitive space both within and without the self known as the ‘play of the mind’, or 
even allowing the very integrity of selfhood to be subverted by humour, trickery, idiocy. 
Or it can be a combination of these rhetorics, and many others. Indeed, as the 
etymology shows, the root of play in English is –dlegh from the Indo-European – 
meaning, literally, movement, motion, energetic engagement. Deleuze’s ‘line of flight’ 
is very congenial here.  
So I’m sympathetic to Law’s notion of a social theory that can cope with ontological 
‘messiness’. My own concern is, precisely in terms of play and the post-human, who 
assumes the power and vision to create post-human hybrids from the ‘mess’ of the 
crucibles of bio-, info- and nano-technology? Our cautionary metaphor in this is always 
ludic – who has the right to ‘play God’ with life? Coming out of computer games 
culture, the answer is ‘everybody’. Witness the forthcoming successor to the Sims 
game, Spore, jokingly known as ‘Sim Universe’, where the player literally evolves an 
organism from cell, to species, to civilisation, to planetary and then interplanetary 
expansion. If this habituates a generation of millenials/GenY’ers into believing they 
have the right to shape and tinker with evolutionary inheritances, then the question is 
truly open as to what a ‘play-with-biology-ethic’ might become. The most illuminating 
debate on this, in my knowledge, is the dispute between Peter Sloterdjik and Jürgen 
Habermas in 1999 (summarised by Brown at [http://www.thenewatlantis.com/ 
archive/5/brownannotated.htm]). It’s too involved to go into here, but I think 
Sloterdijk’s request at the end of his essay ‘Operable Man’ is worth attending to:  
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How can one repeat the choice of life in an epoch in which the antithesis of life and death has been 
deconstructed? How could a blessing be conceived that could overcome the simplified 
confrontation of curse and blessing? How could a new covenant under conditions of complexity be 
formulated? Such questions as these are inspired by the insight that modern thought begets no 
ethics as long as its logic and ontology remain obscure. [http://www.petersloterdijk.net/ 
international/texts/en_texts/en_texts_PS_operable_man.html]. 
I think that a ‘play ethics’ is the appropriate response to a clarified logic and ontology of 
the present, and is necessary for those ‘conditions of complexity’ that mark the post-
human condition. I hope that it follows Sloterdijk’s assumption that the very 
informational density and complexity of genetic understanding ultimately implies a less 
violatory attitude towards ‘matter’ and ‘nature’ – no longer ‘raw’ nature, but 
informational, coded nature, speaking to us of its complexity and emergence. Sloterdijk 
uses provocative language in this quote, but I agree with his trajectory:  
Biotechnologies and nootechnologies nurture by their very nature a subject that is refined, 
cooperative, and prone to playing with itself. This subject shapes itself through intercourse with 
complex texts and hypercomplex contexts. Domination must advance towards its very end, 
because in its rawness it makes itself impossible. In the inter-intelligently condensed net-world, 
masters and rapists [S’s characterisation of traditional uses of technology by power elites] have 
hardly any long-term chances of success left, while cooperators, promoters, and enrichers fit into 
more numerous and more adequate slots. 
SL: Despite Sloterdijk’s optimism here, and I have some sympathy with it, when we 
turn more directly to specific organizing and management practices, it is disappointing 
to find that in the past extremely promising critical analyses have foundered against the 
problem of changing large organizations – the dominant-hegemonic still seems to be 
winning out, for the moment at least. Even in flat organizations, perspectives such as 
feminism and gendered critique have struggled to avoid becoming part of a new 
discursive regime of more sophisticated exploitation and control as part of what Hardt 
and Negri and some of the autonomists, as you mentioned earlier, call immaterial 
labour. As a result it is often argued that approaches based on such critical thinking are 
only possible in small, organic organizational forms, or slower moving public sector 
bodies where market pressures are not so powerful as to prevent the occasional eddy 
forming. Is this true of the play ethic? Can it work in large organizations and the private 
sector without becoming another fad or fashion to stimulate short-term market 
creativity? 
PK: It was something of a revelation to me to read Richard Sennett’s The Culture of the 
New Capitalism, and his useful history of the genesis of the modern organization in 
Bismarck’s military shaping of German bureaucracy – the human pyramid, in whose 
divisions of labour many could find their narrow but secure working identity. (Sennett 
is also clear about the extent to which this was a response to proletarian radicalism at 
the time – a need to find ‘a job for everyone’.) That legacy explains a lot to me about 
the recalcitrance of the large organization in the late twentieth century, in the face of 
critiques from environmentalism, feminism and recently a playful informationalism.  
Is that changing? To be sure, and as many in critical management studies have pointed 
out, the ideology of play is alive and kicking at executive and strategic levels of large 
organizations, in forms of leadership development, and as a rationale for certain kinds 
of culture-change programs. Players at this level are ‘game-changers’ who see the 
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opportunity (often afforded by a pragmatic understanding of complex-systems theory) 
to change certain ‘iterations’ or ‘narratives’ of occupational practice, in order to foment 
‘healthier’ and ‘more generative’ organizational cultures. (These players, of course, 
have their correlate in militarised organizational forms as well, in terms of strategy and 
visioning – which I discuss in my previously mentioned article on the Guardian 
Comment is Free site, ‘The Dangers of ‘Game Changing’). The best examples I know 
of this are IBM’s embrace of the Linux/hacker community, and General Electric’s 
Ecomagination rebranding – attempts by large organizations to embrace elements of the 
hacker and environmental counter-cultures, as an act of ‘adaptive potentiation’ to 
extend their own corporate health and vigour. Though I might agree with Immanuel 
Wallerstein about this being the Di Lampudesa strategy – everything must change, in 
order that nothing changes… [see http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/iw-vien2.htm].  
I’m a bit sceptical that the play ethic is any more realisable, though, in either more 
capacious public sector environments, or in ‘more organic’ small-scale enterprises. 
Certainly the public sector has what I’d call a robust-enough ‘ground of play’, in terms 
of progressive policies on paternal leave, professional development, flexi-time, etc, to 
support the ‘multitude of purposes’ in a properly play-oriented organizational culture. 
Yet despite much rhetoric in recent years about moving away from an overly 
accountable and auditable management model for public services, in my experience 
there is little appetite for the kind of playful spaces and practices that might be seen as 
‘wasting money in the public purse’ (except for, as mentioned above, the BBC).  
I am also sceptical that smaller enterprises with less or no organizational legacy (other 
than that which their founders bring to them from previous experiences) will fully 
realise a play ethic on their own either, for precisely the converse reason – that they 
have no or little ‘ground of play’ that could sustain levels of frenetic ‘start-up’ energy 
and inventiveness. (Andrew Ross writes about this well in his study of Silicon Alley 
digital companies in the late 1990s, No Collar). I find more promising shifts in political 
culture – coalescing around the ‘well-being’ and ‘happiness’ agenda, and currently 
peddled by all three mainstream parties in the UK. This might result in a round of 
market regulation (specifically, the reduction of overall working hours, social dividend 
schemes, democratic and equitable parenting rights) which genuinely increases the 
zones of autonomy and self-determination in British citizens’ lives. With Andre Gorz, I 
believe that it is only genuine experiences of existential self-determination conducted in 
free-time and free-space – not the pseudo-experiences provided by much organizational 
culture – that allows workers to perceive either the alienations of their existing job, or 
the lineaments of a new and better occupation or practice. I go along with Hardt and 
Negri at the end of Empire, where they conclude that “the generality of biopolitical 
production” – where every aspect of our lives, communicational as well as physical, is 
needed by capital – can only be justified if an equally general system of social support 
is provided – what they call a “social or citizenship wage”.  
Players – or what I call in the Play Ethic ‘soulitarians’ – are well aware that their 
effective participation in contemporary capitalism requires their full psycho-somatic 
commitment. And thus aware, they will struggle to establish non-market spaces wherein 
that commitment can be measured and mitigated. The question of how soulitarians 
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become a class for themselves, rather than just in themselves, is of course key. I concur 
with Paulo Virno on the difficulties of this: 
Contemporary capitalist production mobilizes to its advantage all the attitudes characterizing our 
species, putting to work life as such. Now, if it is true that post-Fordist production appropriates 
“life”—that is to say, the totality of specifically human faculties—it is fairly obvious that 
insubordination against it is going to rest on the same basic datum of fact. To life involved in 
flexible production is opposed the instance of a “good life.” And the search for a good life is 
indeed the theme of ethics. (Brown, 2005: 35-36) 
Here is at once the difficulty and the extraordinarily interesting challenge. The primacy 
of ethics is the direct result of the material relations of production. But at first glance 
this primacy seems to get away from what, all the same, has provoked it. An ethical 
movement finds it hard to interfere with the way in which surplus value is formed 
today. The workforce that is at the heart of globalized post-Fordism – precarious, 
flexible border-workers between employment and unemployment – defends some very 
general principles related to the ‘human condition’: freedom of language, sharing of that 
common good that is knowledge, peace, the safeguarding of the natural environment, 
justice and solidarity, aspiration to a public sphere in which might be valorized the 
uniqueness and unrepeatability of every single existence. The ethical instance, while 
taking root in the social working day, flies over it at a great height without altering the 
relations of force that operate at its interior.  
Whoever mistrusts the movement’s ethical attack, rebuking it for disregarding the class struggle 
against exploitation is wrong. But for symmetrical reasons, they are also wrong who, pleased by 
this ethical attack, believe that the latter might put aside categories such as “exploitation” and “the 
class struggle.” In both cases, one lets slip the decisive point: the polemical link between the 
instance of the “good life” (embodied by Genoa and Porto Alegre) and life put to work (the 
fulcrum of the post-Fordist enterprise). [http://info.interactivist.net/print.pl?sid=06/01/17/ 
2225239] 
SL: An important theme post-Fordist theme in the book is the developing information 
age, to borrow Castells’ terminology. I’d like to focus on one aspect of that now. If it is 
true that new network forms of communication can lead both to new distributed forms 
of surveillance and control but also to new distributed forms of authority and 
democracy, how can the play ethic help us to avoid the one and embrace the other as we 
play across technological forms? And as the role of leadership is going to be significant 
for managing any transition in formal organizations as we currently know them, does 
this imply a new style of leadership with a new skill set for which we should be training 
and developing managers – a sort of open source leadership? 
PK: I think, to pick up from the previous answer, that a play ethic can help to make that 
polemical link between ‘the good life’ and ‘life put to work’. That is, the vernacular, 
quotidian experience of play – as a zone of qualitative autonomy, as Galloway puts it – 
provides a surfeit of consciousness that can keep networks operating in an expressive, 
inclusive and open-ended way. Unlike Galloway, I don’t think that, for example, the 
entire experience of computer-gaming – now a major defining articulacy of the Gen Y 
demographic – is simply a kind of mimicry of unfree labour. There are non-linear, 
symbolic, exploratory, emergent gaming experiences now appearing – Spore is just one, 
but Katamari Damancy might be another – where I’m convinced that a different 
epistemology is being developed by the user in the game-play. I think the astounding 
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vigour and variety of current expressions of social software – from blogging to 
MySpace – that arose from the Dot-Bust of the early oughties, and the exponential 
increase in broadband internet, show that consumer-citizens are demanding to be 
semiotic and communicational ‘players’, a demand which is clearly driving network 
development. So the ‘playspace’ of current informational culture is, I think, the crucible 
for that link between ‘good life’ and ‘life put to work’, between ethics and aspirations 
and the managerial strictures of the organization /enterprise, to be forged.  
As for leadership in this environment, I think the terms ‘followership’ or ‘servant 
leadership’ – however ghastly their previous uses – may well be coming into their own 
here. Leaders within organizations who recognise, as Negri puts it, the “production-
through-communication” of the multitude (and that section of it which comprises their 
workforce), are surely compelled to re-examine their strategic and executive function. 
An ‘open-source’ leadership would be one which, to extend the metaphor, opened out 
the kernel of its authority to tinkering, adaptation and improvement by an engaged 
community. The idea of ‘leader-as-narrator/chief-storyteller’ might be an effective 
realisation of this – someone who listens more to the operational stories of a workforce, 
than its metrics of performance, as an indicator of the real value of the company, and as 
a better guide to its strategic direction in the marketplace and society. Yet the skill-set 
required by that is more akin to the lead conductor in an orchestra (or the lead musician 
in a rock-group!), or a psychotherapist, or a good story-maker (fictional or journalistic), 
than to the McKinsey model of system-steering, number-crunching, and corporate-
culture managing. The self-proclaimed business revolutionary Ricardo Semler – author 
of the Seven-Day Weekend – would seem to run Semco in this narrative-based mode.  
Other than that, I was impressed by the 2003 Demos paper by Paul Skidmore on 
‘Leading Between’, a vision for managers in the network age [http://www.demos.co. 
uk/files/File/networklogic07skidmore.pdf#search=%22paul%20skidmore%20leading%
20between%22]. Skidmore’s headline recommendations at least hint at the softer, more 
open imperatives of a manager of players in a productive network, in that “network 
leaders”: lead from the outside in; mobilise disparate supplies of energy; foster trust and 
empower others to act; help people grow out of their comfort zones; are lead learners 
not all-knowers; and nurture other leaders.  
SL: The point about nurturing recalls your earlier point about the possibility of an ethics 
of care. You’ve hinted in what you’ve said here that in talking about the work ethic we 
are in fact invoking a multiplicity of work ethics, and that the play ethic may itself have 
multiple dimensions. But for the moment I’d like to stick with the opposition implied 
between the two. In the book you expand a little on the Care ethic, that you see 
operating more alongside the Play ethic in your own life than the Work ethic. But 
perhaps it’s my old-fashioned sense of structural equilibrium that suggests that if this is 
so, with a play-work opposition and a play-care continuum, there must be an 
antinomous ethic operating to suppress it in the present. What then is the opposite of 
care? I’d like to suggest that you given us the answer already – some of the other 
comments you’ve made earlier are actually observations of the existence of a War ethic, 
one that underpins the idea of legitimate war, that allows allies to invade a country that 
hasn’t attacked them, and that renders terrorism illegitimate whilst simultaneously 
rendering pacificism unpatriotic. Of course, such an ethic works hand-in-hand with the 
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work ethic in the military industrial complex as you’ve also hinted earlier – and if this is 
true it both gives us an idea of the size of the task of inaugurating an episteme in which 
the play and care ethics might have the upper hand, but also underlines the importance 
of such a project. Would you agree? 
PK: Absolutely – to underline what I said earlier, I thoroughly agree that the stakes are 
extremely high, in these militarized times, around the uses and powers of play. If an 
ontology of play reveals the processual, contestable nature of reality, then to some 
extent a ‘war ethic’ – particularly as practised by the current Anglo-American junta – is 
a move upon the surface of, and exploiting the openness of, the play of reality itself. I 
am reminded of the quote from the Bush aide in 2004, who claimed that “we are an 
Empire, and when we act, we create our own reality”. This is as monstrously playful as 
it gets: my Guardian piece above suggests that there are other ways to playfully ‘create 
your own reality’, of course, than the exercise of imperial power. At the very least, 
information about the amoral behaviour of this empire – from Abu Ghraib to 
Guantanamo, their evidence often gathered and disseminated through new technologies 
– can still produce visible cracks in the spectacle of its dominance. This is a counter-
game, one that is fully enabled by our networked world of bloggers, cameraphoners and 
activists. It is the more positive side of our unstable and chaotic world order.  
Galloway’s point in his piece on networks and play, quoted above – that the mobile and 
mutable power of networks is now an instrument of imperial power, in the form of the 
Full Spectrum Dominance of the US Military – is well taken. Add to this a developed 
play consciousness – at least in its agonistic and egoistic modes – and it could easily 
seem that an anti-play position might easily formulate itself politically. Yet if the terrain 
of struggle is as immanently networked as Negri and Hardt claim, then it strikes me that 
the only tools available for counter-power – or at least ones that value a genuine 
emergent interactivity, as opposed to terrorist or state-terrorist uses of the spectacle to 
traumatize passive viewers – are those derived from a different part of the play 
spectrum. And it will be these, rather than some revived-Enlightenment vision of 
rational will-formation (as in the Habermas model), which rejects the generativity and 
messiness of informational networks for a kind of transparent, linguistically-Puritan 
public sphere. As Deleuze and Guattari (1996: 108) say, “we do not lack 
communication, on the contrary we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack 
resistance to the present.”  
That dangerous power of play – to simulate reality, to take it lightly, to open out a space 
of potentiation within the very fixity of species-being itself – is an element of that 
resistance to the present, indeed might well be its necessary psychological and cognitive 
resource. Yet the point about the ‘care’ end of the play-care continuum is to create a 
kind of humanising polarity whereby the sheer responsiveness and febrility of play can 
be tempered, through a recognition of the costs of play upon those without the strength, 
energy and resilience to participate in its social forms. My ‘play ethic’, in any case, tries 
to establish a continuum between the ‘response-abilities’ that play and care both draw 
on – and which means, in essence, an emphasis on social, developmental, imaginative 
play, a downgrading of agonistic and egoistic play, and a re-inversion of cosmic play: 
not the Gods of American Empire playing with our reality, but an utterly interdependent 
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and evolving universe, where creative action has fruitful but unpredictable 
consequences.  
RM: If I could back up a little to return to the relationship of the play ethic to that of 
care, it is certainly one of the most interesting aspects of the book from a social policy 
perspective, especially with regard to our altered perception of the latter once it is 
moved from the realms of imposition and work. Specifically, the idea that care may 
form part of the subjective expression of self in-play offers a very different perspective 
on the role of the carer and the processes of caring. Yet, as a responsibility (within your 
own scheme), and thus potentially an imposition, can individual subjectivities be fully 
at play in most care relationships and processes. I’m think, for example, of: the husband 
left to care for the partner with dementia, the prison officer for the offender, the parent 
for the unwanted child, the nurse for the abusive patient...? 
PK: Again, I’ll reiterate that care is as open to contingency and unpredictability as play, 
if it is done well – that is, if it is truly open in our response-ability to the Other in need. 
But the carer arrests the virtuality of human experience – does not impose the 
expectations of semiotic freedom, fecundity and expressiveness in the cared-for – and 
responds to the actuality of human need and weakness. Care of course has its own 
infinitudes of gentleness, incremental improvement, listening to and encouraging 
narratives of self-determination. I think we’re already moving into an era where 
qualitative human relationships – whether exploited as biopower in the Negrian sense, 
or not – are becoming the primary act that constitutes society. My hope is that we can 
reap the benefits of post-scarcity and allow our lives to be composed of reciprocations 
that can arrange, counterpoint and overlap the modalities of play and care. The further 
we move from the absurd mechanistics and semi-military structures of the ‘working 
organization’ – following schemes of social dividend that decentre institutional work 
from our lives – the more that we will come to value the act of care for a demented 
husband, or young miscreant, or angry patient, the in-care child, as yet another form of 
response ability. Care reminds us of the essential fragility that subtends, and gives 
dramatic richness to, the life of vigorous, creative, potentiating play. In a strong sense, 
my play ethic is akin to a communitarianism that recognises the ethical bounties of 
affluence: the right to play, balanced by the responsibility to care.  
Ed Wray-Bliss: It seems to me that you are doing something similar with the idea of the 
‘play ethic’ that Marx did with the concept of ‘labour’. For instance Marx used ‘labour’ 
to signify and celebrate a process where human beings sought to explore their 
potentiality and creativity, to stretch themselves and make themselves anew. He 
criticised the alienation of people from this sense of their own potentiality, the way that 
labour in capitalist organizations became colonised by and limited to the reproduction 
of capital rather than the creation or realisation of ‘self’. And your concept of the play 
ethic seems to celebrate the same sense of human agency as a celebration and recreation 
of human potentiality – and this is very welcome. A difference however seems to be 
that where Marx, by using the concept of labour – a term also rooted in economic or 
organizational realms – directed his critique at the need to transform capitalist 
organizations such that all labour could be unalienated, you seem to clearly separate 
‘play’ from ‘work’ and see them as separate realms. My question is where does this 
move leave us politically? Is the Play Ethic to be pursued (only) outside of the work 
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organization context? Does this risk leaving the ‘work’ context unchallenged? And if so 
– if ‘play’ only happened in the spaces left after ‘work’ – wouldn’t this undermine 
opportunities for individuals to explore and express their potentiality? 
PK: I think play is closer to what Marx conceived of as ‘unalienated labour’ than work. 
Eagleton makes the point in the Ideology of the Aesthetic that Schiller’s evocation of the 
play-drive as a synthesis of form and sense, rationality and irrationality, in an 
aesthetically-pursued life, actually inspired the young Marx in his theories of alienation 
– it gave him a sense of the richly realised self that he identified capitalist organization 
as repressing and preventing. For me, play cultures and practices today are capable 
(though it’s not inevitable) of giving people that sense of self-possession, and of their 
activities as acts of poiesis, of authored creation, that the Romantic poets and 
philosophers first evoked in their responses to industrial modernity. But the challenges 
that these play cultures pose to existing organizational forms, precisely in their 
formation as sites for the exchange of wage-labour, is profound. Yochai Benkler’s new 
book The Wealth of Networks shows brilliantly that the open networks of the 
information society are producing a new economic logic of ‘social cooperation’, 
supplementing those forms of exchange conducted under private-managerial or state-
bureaucratic systems of production, distribution and allocation. It’s a matter of record 
that the pioneers of these forms – the hackers and net-entrepreneurs who enrich the 
information commons with their social software (open source, blogs, MySpace, online 
games, friendship networks, etc) – are happiest operating very much outwith the 
recognisable environs of ‘work’. And the services they offer are intended – in their 
emphasis on the sharing of culture, music, community – to appeal to those blurred 
spaces between ‘work’ and ‘leisure’, a kind of general ‘activism’. Play, in its more 
cooperative and mutualist forms, is very much the sensibility driving these 
developments. In answer to your question about whether this abandons existing work 
cultures politically, I feel that there is such a radical re-thinking of our purposive and 
passional lives implied by the play ethic (and the network society that it seeks to 
influence and direct), that the best location for an informational politics is not within the 
workplace per se. Although I don’t share their labour-movement vocabulary of the 
‘social factory’, I do agree with the Italian autonomists that it’s the organizations that 
emerge from the ‘general intellect’, or the ‘multitude producing in its communicational 
generality’, that are worth the watching. My experiences within existing consulting 
contexts have made the limits of modernist organizational structures very clear to me! 
Andy McColl: With apologies, Pat, this is a comment and a two-part question! My 
questions come from a concern that the ‘play ethic’ may be something that is real for 
people in the cultural industries, but would have little resonance in many other sectors, 
and with the real problems of access to ‘play’ in the information age … 
… PK: which I share… and I hope that many of my previous answers have pointed 
towards what I consider to be the high-stakes of a ‘play ethic’ – our need to cope with 
our capacity to challenge and transcend limits, in areas of war, bioscience and our 
affective lives….. 
… AM: … OK so the first question is…. you claim that the play ethic is realisable in a 
‘post-scarcity’ society in which the internet can be seen as an enabling medium. 
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However, the argument could be made that scarcity was largely overcome with 
industrialisation in the 19th century, and it would be more accurate to describe the 
western industrialised democracies as an example of ‘planned scarcity’ where one’s 
access to the resources of society is dependent upon where one sits in the socio-
economic hierarchy. In this scenario the play ethic in one sense is not generalisable, and 
the medium of the internet takes on a darker tone as a form of control premised upon 
old forms of industrial organization – workers, vans and warehouses! How do you 
overcome these kind of objections?  
PK: The rise of mass advertising, as a response to stagnating inventories and the need to 
increase the appetites of a satiated proletariat, has always fascinated me, particularly 
when I discovered the pivotal role of Edward Bernays, the psychology-practising 
nephew of Sigmund Freud, in its creation.4 My point is that post-scarcity is as much 
about an abundance of subjective as much as objective resources. Indeed, the very crisis 
of advertising (particularly in the late 20th-early 21st century) is that it faces a majority 
population in the richer countries for whom – post-feminism and environmentalism – 
the claims to a ‘better life through consumption’ is at least open to question from 
alternative, yet accessible, counter-factual knowledge cultures. The question of socio-
economic hierarchy in these conditions – which is more about the acceleration and 
aggrandisement of knowledge elites, than about the decline or immiseration of those 
below – is actually directly addressed by forms of play, at least in terms of the 
ungovernability of younger generations as subjects of labour: those 
Asbos/workshy/wannabe celebrities, wearing their playful raiment of sports gear and 
Kappa suits, that raise the ire of the Daily Mail. Their evident unwillingness to mount 
the vans and stock the shelves of the service society, as currently arranged, is to me 
perfectly understandable – given the sheer utopian splendour that capitalist promotional 
culture holds out to them, via every screen at their disposal. Young ‘players’ are some 
of the most self-conscious rebels against the work ethic. Our huge challenge as a society 
is to respond to the imaginative and passional deficit revealed by their sheer rejection of 
the work ethic – a challenge which implies changes in welfare provision, marketplace 
regulation and public services barely even thinkable at present.  
AM: The second question isn’t really a question, but you’ve previously made reference 
to scenario planning as a form of play drawing upon some of the experiences of 
companies like Shell etc. In fact, scenario planning (as far as I’m aware) developed out 
of military contingency planning and was later picked up by the oil companies. Given 
the continuing close relationship between guns and oil as illustrated in the Gulf War, 
doesn’t this seem to lend further support to your arguments on the crossovers between 
war and play? 
PK: Yes, I think it does! Emphatically. 
Sebastian Bos: I wonder if you could focus on the ethical issues of the play ethic in 
areas where ethics has perhaps had a higher and more specific profile such as gene-
modification and stemcell research, which you mentioned in passing earlier. Do you 
__________ 
4  A brief summary of Bernays’ contribution and some key references can be found in Linstead et al. 
(2004: 304-305; 319). 
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believe that the role of play should be limited in such areas where ethical standards have 
not yet been agreed on? 
PK: Sloterdijk’s optimism about how the knowledge of the biological complexity of life 
might engender a different, more benignly playful form of science, is one I share. Of 
course, he and I could be horribly wrong on this... Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake 
is the downside view on a society in which an ambition to be utterly in control of the 
bios has disastrous consequences; Iain M Banks’ culture novels (e.g. 1992) represent a 
jollier, more pragmatic upside of society with full nano-and-bio-mastery. I am also in 
sympathy with the posthuman democratic socialist position of James Hughes in Citizen 
Cyborg.  
SB: Could I follow up on that, and ask you to be more specific, because many managers 
of bio-tech companies find themselves operating in different cultural settings with 
various culturally relative ethical standards. What implications do such variations have 
for a play ethic?  
PK: That is a huge question, particularly in spiritual settings like Buddhism and 
Hinduism, where a post-subjective or post-human universe is presumed. You’ve 
identified my next burst of research! This is going to be in the direction of these darker 
and more demanding aspects of a ‘play ethic’, so let me take a pause on answering that 
question till later.  
RM: Finally, can I take advantage of my position as Chair and steal the last question 
which I suppose is the big one – how do you prevent the notion of play ethics becoming 
more than just a potentially lucrative guru fad? 
PK: I hope by subjecting myself to rigorous symposia like this one!  
RM: Pat – on behalf of us all can I thank you heartily for that subjection, and say how 
much we are looking forward to the next such occasion. 
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